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ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR MUNICIPAL AIRPORT
OPERATIONS: WILL IT FLY?
WILSON CHU
A LMOST ALL OF THE major airports in the United
States are owned and operated by state and local govern-
mental authorities.' Prior to the United States Supreme
Court decision in 1978 in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 2 the operation of these airports enjoyed almost
complete immunity from antitrust scrutiny. This immunity
was derived from a broad reading of the so-called state action
exemption of Parker v. Brown .' The Parker holding was inter-
preted as providing a blanket exemption from antitrust liabil-
ity for acts of states and their agencies, as well as for those of
municipalities5 and certain special agencies authorized to op-
erate regional airport authorities.6 The Parker decision, how-
' Hermann, Airports and the Apph'cabih'y of the Antitrust Laws, 45 ALB. L. REV. 353,
355 (1981). The only major public airports owned and operated by the federal govern-
ment are Washington National Airport and Dulles International Airport. Id.
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
:, Hart, State Action Antitrust Immunity For Airport Operators, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 2
(1980); Hermann, supra note 1, at 353. The scope of this article will be limited to the
question of antitrust liability for the municipal airport operator. The issue of antitrust
liability for those private parties who deal with the airports will not be examined.
These private defendants may be immune, however, under the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine which holds that the Sherman Act does not apply to political lobbying to influ-
ence legislative enactments which result in a restriction of competition. See generally 1 P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 62 (Supp. 1982) (discussing the relationship of the Noerr-
Pennington and Parker immunities); Hermann, supra note 1, at 373.
4 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
r' For the purposes of this article, "municipalities" include counties and their agen-
cies, cities and their agencies and other local governmental entities. See Hart, supra note
3, at 3.
6 See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir.
1974); Continental Bus System v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974). See
also Bangasser, Exposure of Municipal Corporations to Liabilityfor Violations of the Antitrust
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ever, was narrowly interpreted by the Court in City of
Lafayette which held that a municipal defendant's mere status
as a governmental entity does not automatically entitle it to a
grant of immunity for its anticompetitive actions.7 Thus, Cty
of Lafayette had a restraining effect on the conduct of munici-
palities and other political subdivisions by exposing these en-
tities to possible antitrust liability under the Sherman Act,8
which had previously been applied only to private
defendants.
By requiring airport operators to structure their decision
-making processes in light of potential municipal antitrust lia-
bility, City of Lafayette and its progeny9 place constraints on
municipal airport operations beyond their regulation by the
Federal Aviation Act and the normal market forces.10 More-
over, the recent decision in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder" removes a substantial loophole for municipalities.
Laws: Antitrust Immunity After the City of Lafayette, 11 URB. LAw vii, xxiv-xxvi (1979);
Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1362, 1382 (1978).
7 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 411. Actions of a
state in its sovereign capacity, i.e., state actions, are still immune under the Parker doc-
trine. Id at 409..
n 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Most federal antitrust actions brought against municipal-
ties are brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., E. W. Wiggins
Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
947 (1966); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Section
I of the Sherman Act provides, inter alia:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides, inter aha: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a felony
.
.15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 90 (1978).
Io See, e.g., Continental Bus System v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D.
Tex. 1974)(Continental claimed that an "exclusive franchise" granted to Surtran at
the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport was violative of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1349(a). Section 1349(a) provides that "there shall be no exclusive right for
the use of any landing . . . facility upon which Federal funds have been expended.")
See also, Hart, supra note 3, at 1.
" 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
City of Boulder held that the general grant of powers by the
state to "home-rule" municipalities1 2 is insufficient to qualify
the anticompetitive activity of such a municipality for the
state action exemption.' 3 Taken together then City of Lafay-
ette and City of Boulder firmly require that potentially an-
ticompetitive acts by municipalities receive more specific
state legislative authorization than a general grant of regula-
tory powers.
This article will focus on airport activity in the context of
the municipality as a grantor of exclusive franchises to fixed
base operators 4 (FBO) and to ground transportation systems.
First, a historical examination will be made of municipal air-
port antitrust cases decided before City of Lafayette. Second,
cases decided after City of Lafayette will be discussed to trace
changes in the judicial attitude toward and the application of
the state action doctrine in the municipal defendant context.
Third, in light of the developing municipal antitrust law, this
article will explore several suggestions designed to help mu-
nicipal airport operators avoid potential antitrust liability.
Within this framework, the substantive issue of antitrust lia-
bility will be addressed in the event the threshold immunity is
denied. Finally, this article will examine the type of sanctions
and remedies available under the municipal antitrust laws
and the need to limit the types of sanctions because of the
municipality's status as a public entity.
,2 A "home-rule" municipality is one which is granted extensive powers of self-gov-
ernment by the state constitution. A "home-rule" municipality is "entitled to exercise
'the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters' [and] the City
Charter and ordinances supercede the laws of the State." Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 837. Additionally, as some commentators
have noted, "the fundamental purpose of home rule is to allow both the cities and the
state to exercise power coordinately so that problems can be solved at either or both
levels of government." Freilich and Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Re-
turn To The Dark Ages Before Home-Rule, 14 URB. LAW. No. 2 v (1982).
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843.
" "A fixed base operation is one that provides facilities, fuel, equipment, supplies
and services at an airport. . . ." E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Author-
ity, 362 F.2d 52, 53 n.2 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966). An FBO
provides the same services to airplanes as do gas stations to motorists. Pinehurst Air-
lines v. Resort Air Serv., 476 F. Supp. 543, 548 n.l (M.D.N.C. 1979).
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I. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY: PARKER V BROWN
Cases decided before City of Lafayette 5 were generally lib-
eral in granting state action immunity to a variety of govern-
ment entities so long as the activity in question was a bona
fide governmental activity. 16 The almost automatic grant of
immunity upon a finding of a governmental activity was
partly based on an interpretation of the Sherman Act by the
Court in Parker v. Brown " which stated that "its purpose was
to suppress combinations to restrain competition and at-
tempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations."' 8
Parker v. Brown is generally agreed to be the genesis of the
state action defense.' 9 Parker involved an antitrust attack by
a private raisin grower, Brown, who sought to enjoin admin-
istration of the California Agricultural Prorate Act.20 The
Act authorized a program which was an anticompetitive
scheme designed to cure a persistent problem of overproduc-
tion and the harmful effects of oversupply in the California
raisin industry2' through maintenance of prices and the re-
', 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
'6 See, e.g., Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 227 (9th Cir.
1975) (state action immunity was granted to city council which awarded an exclusive
cable television franchise to CATV even though such actions resulted in a restraint of
trade); Padgett v. Louisville &Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258, 1260 (6th Cir.
1974) (air board in contracting for cab service to the exclusion of independent cab
drivers was exercising a valid governmental function to which the antitrust laws do not
apply); Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 433 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1973)
(a state agency, UIL, which disallowed use of Saenz's product in a contest was immune
from the Sherman Act because it was a governmental entity). See also Hart, supra note
3, at 10.
" 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
, The courts had dealt with the applicability of federal antitrust laws to state action
prior to Parker. In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), an unlicensed pilot challenged
Texas' pilot licensing laws claiming that the regulation suppressed the trade of unli-
censed pilots in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court, however, found no antitrust
violation, holding that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from
the fact that duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the
duties devolving upon them by law." Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. at 345. In an earlier
case, Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. Supp. 908 (D.S.C. 1895), a North Carolina liquor
dealer challenged a South Carolina liquor monopoly. The court dismissed the suit
holding that the state was not a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act. See
Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1972).
20 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 344.
1 d. at 364. The purpose of the Prorate Act was to "conserve the agricultural
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striction of competition. 22 The program was supervised by a
nine member Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, of
which the Director of Agriculture was an ex-officio member,
and the remaining eight members were appointed by the gov-
ernor and confirmed by the state senate. 23  Brown challenged
the validity of the proration program as violative of the Com-
merce Clause 24 and the Sherman Act. 25 In holding that the
raisin prorate program was not subject to Sherman Act scru-
tiny, the unanimous Court stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state
or its officer or its agents from activities directed by its legisla-
ture. In a dual system of government . . .an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officer is not lightly
to be attributed to Congress. . . .The state in adopting and
enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agree-
ment and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to
establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act
of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. 26
The Court concluded that the Sherman Act was a prohibi-
tion of "individual and not state action. '27  In comparision,
wealth of the State" and to "prevent economic waste in marketing of products" of the
State. Id. at 346.
22 Id at 346.
.2 Id The commission was authorized to establish a prorate marketing plan upon
petition of ten producers and after a public hearing which established that proration is
needed to "prevent agricultural waste and conserve agricultural wealth of the state
without permitting unreasonable profits to producers . Id.
2- U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 344. Brown contended that unless enjoined, the
Commission would prevent him from marketing his raisin crop in interstate commerce
under threat of criminal prosecution. Id. at 349.
Id at 350-52 (emphasis added).
21 Id at 350-51. There is considerable debate as to whether "state action" immunity
in Parker is an example of federal preemption or of an exemption from antitrust laws.
See Hart, supra note 3, at 19-22. Federal preemption operates to reconcile conflicts
between two sovereigns - one federal and the other state. Preemption occurs where
there is exclusive federal occupation of a particular field or where the federal law di-
rectly conflicts with a state law. Handler, supra note 6, at 1379. In either case, occupa-
tion or conflict, the federal law will invalidate state law by virtue of the supremacy
clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Id at 1380. The exemption doctrine deals with a
single sovereign, Congress, which expressly or impliedly removes a certain activity or
party from coverage of a federal enactment. Id at 1378; Hermann,supra note 1, at 357
n. 16. Parker is apparently a prima facie case of federal preemption because the Court
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the Court stated that the California prorate program would
have been violative of the Sherman Act had it been organ-
ized and controlled solely by a conspiracy of private persons,
individual or corporate.2 8
II. PRE-CITY OF LAFAYETTE DECISIONS
Based on Parker's interpretation of the Sherman Act as
prohibiting "individual and not state action, ' 29 the courts
routinely upheld the state action defense against a variety of
antitrust challenges to operators of municipal airports. In
E W. W4ggi'ns Airways v. Masschusetts Port Authorit', 30 a fixed
base operator (FBO),3' Wiggins, brought an antitrust action
against the Massachusetts Port Authority (Authority) which
owned and operated Boston's Logan Airport. 32 The Author-
ity was a special agency created by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture to operate Boston's airports and other transportation
facilities.3 3 The Authority refused to renew Wiggins' FBO
stated that Congress had the legislative power to occupy the field encompassed by the
California prorate program, and thereby to suspend the state law. Application of prin-
ciples of federalism, however, caused the Court to conclude that, as in the case of the
Sherman Act, "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351.
Several noted authorities favor treatment of state action as an issue of federal preemp-
tion. See, e.g., I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 60 (1978); Handler, supra
note 6, at 1379-82. On the other hand, the Supreme Court, subsequent to Parker,
generally refers to state action immunity as an issue of exemption rather than preemp-
tion. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 414 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596-
98 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975). For an interest-
ing as well as esoteric analysis of antitrust laws and principles of federalism in admi-
ralty jurisdiction, see I B. BURGLASS, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 86 (1981 & Supp.
1983).
2a 317 U.S. at 350-51.
- Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 352.
- 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
:1 An FBO provides ground support used in aviation, such as facilities, fuel, equip-
ment, supplies and services. Id. at 53 n.2
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55. The Massachusetts statute provides that "the Authority is hereby con-
stituted a public instrumentality and the exercise by the Authority of the powers con-
ferred by this Act shall be deemed and held to be the performance of an essential
governmntal/&naton." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 73, § 32 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1967) (em-
phasis added). Under a general grant of powers, the Authority was authorized to
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lease34 pursuant to a decision to establish a competitor, Butler
Aviation-Boston, Inc., 35 as the sole and exclusive FBO at Lo-
gan Airport.3 6 Wiggins' complaint alleged that the defend-
ants entered into a combination in restraint of trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.37 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, however, stated that the Au-
thority was a public instrumentality performing an essential
governmental function. 8 Thus, in establishing an FBO mo-
nopoly, the Authority "was acting as an instrumentality or
agency of the state, pursuant to legislative mandate imposed
upon it to operate the airport and establish rules and regula-
tions for its use." 39 Accordingly, the First Circuit granted
state action immunity to the Authority since the activity
complained of was a restraint of competition resulting from
governmental activity.' Reaffirming Parker, the court con-
cluded that "the antitrust laws are aimed at private action,
not at governmental action."'"
In Ladue Local Lines v. B-State Development Agency ,42 the issue
involved the power of the regional transportation authority
to monopolize a public transportation market. The defend-
ant, Bi-State, was an agency of Missouri and Illinois expressly
authorized to own and operate, inter aha, "airports . . . [and]
"lease as lessor or as lessee..., and [to] operate the projects under its control, and to
establish rules and regulations for the use of any such project." Id. at § 3.
:. Wiggins Airways and Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies of New England were the
original FBO's at Logan. Wiggins' lease expired December 31, 1959. The Authority
denied Wiggins' request for a lease renewal, but it allowed Wiggins to continue its
operations as a tenant at will. E. W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
362 F.2d at 54.
:1, Defendants in the suit were the Authority, Butler Aviation-Boston, Inc., and But-
ler Company. Id at 53.
:11 Id
:,7 Id Wiggins previously filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation Authority
(FAA) that establishment of Butler as Logan's sole and exclusive FBO was in violation
of the Federal Aviation Act. Id at 54. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
The FAA's intervention, however, arrived too late to help Wiggins, which had already
sold its airport facilities and equipment to Butler and had departed from the airport.
362 F.2d at 54.
m Id. at 55. See supra note 33.
362 F.2d at 55.
0 Id
Id (emphasis added).
42 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
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passenger tranportation facilities. '4 3  Ladue Lines alleged
that its competing business was destroyed by Bi-State's at-
tempted monopolization of the school bus market." Ladue
argued that the bussing of school children was not a recog-
nized governmental function and that because such activity
was proprietary in nature, Bi-State should not benefit from
sovereign immunity.45 The court, however, rejected Ladue's
distinction and held that under the Parker doctrine, "the anti-
trust laws do not apply whether the operation is labeled pro-
prietary or governmental. ' 46 The court reasoned that even if
Bi-State had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in a
propietary activity, Congress had not "impose[d] liability
since antitrust laws are not directed at governmental ac-
tion."4 7 In strict reliance on Parker, therefore, the court stated
that the "right and remedy plaintiff seeks to invoke there is
simply not available. 4
Municipal antitrust litigation arises not only in the context
of a transportation authority acting as a monopoly but also
where a public authority acts as a grantor of exclusive
licenses. In Padgett v. LouwisVIlle Jefferson County Air Board,49 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the outcome
of the antitrust issue is no different where the transportation
authority awards an exclusive contract to a private company
to provide ground transportation at a public facility such as
an airport." In Padgett, the Air Board awarded Yellow Cab
13 Id. at 133.
11 Id. at 134. Bi-State's challenged anticompetitive activities were that it purchased
most of the public service lines, charged an unreasonably low price for student passes,
eliminated certain service charges, and acquired school bus service contracts without
competitive bidding or was not the low bidder where bids were invited. Id
11 Id Ladue relied on the recognized distinction between governmental and proprie-
tary activities in the context of tort and tax liability. Id.
Id. at 137.
Id at 134. The court also cited E W. Wiggins irways as settled authority that "we
do not reach any question of immunity since there was no attempt on part of Congress
to impose liability [under the antitrust laws] in the first place." Id at 135 (citing E. W.
Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d at 56).
- Id at 134.
4 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
- Id at 1260.
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Company a contract to service Louisville's airport.5 Padgett
and other independent taxicab drivers brought an antitrust
action for damages under the Sherman Act.52 In words
clearly reflecting the pre-C'y of Lafayette attitude concerning
the state action doctrine, the court stated, "we find it unnec-
essary to submit Parker to an extensive analysis for the pur-
poses of the instant case.''"
The Padgett court's summary analysis relied on construc-
tion of the Kentucky statute which created the Air Board.54
The court concluded that the Air Board was a quasi-govern-
mental agency legislatively created to operate the airport.55
The court also found that the regulation of ground transpor-
tation services was necessarily incidental56 to the operation of
airport facilities.57 Since the Air Board's decision to include
independent taxi drivers was well within its broad statutory
grant to "operate [the airport as] a virtual monopoly,"5 the
court concluded that the Air Board "was exercising a valid
governmental function to which the antitrust laws do not
apply.""
In Padgett, as well as in E W. Wgins and Ladue, the courts
granted state action immunity to regional transportation au-
thorities which were determined to have been exercising gov-
ernmental functions. The activity was determined to be
governmental because it was based on the authorization of
51 Id at 1259.
r,2 Id. at 1258.
Id at 1259.
The Kentucky statute provides:
[A]cquistion, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement,
maintenance, equipping and operation of airports . . . and the exercise
of any other powers granted to air boards or municipalties in this chap-
ter, are hereby declared to be public, governmental and munic palfunctions, exercised
for a pubhc purpose, and matters of public necessity ....
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.476 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) (emphasis added).
' Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d at 1260.
See generally Hermann, supra note 1, at 355 (discussing central and subsidary activ-
ities of airports and their relation to airport antitrust liability).
Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d at 1260.
" Id See supra note 54.
- Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d at 1260.
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state legislation. 6° In all three cases, the statutes were con-
strued as providing broad regulatory powers.6'
In Conti'ental Bus System v. City of Dallas,62 the airport opera-
tors were cities rather than state-authorized agencies. 63 The
antitrust action was brought by Continental, a private bus
company, against the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth.64 Con-
tinental alleged that the cities, by enacting identical ordi-
nances prohibiting unlicensed competition with Surtran 65 at
the Dallas-Ft. Worth Regional Airport (DFW), had created a
monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act.6 6 Since the de-
fendants were cities, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas dispensed with the statutory construction and
analysis upon which the previous cases had relied. 67  The
court held that the granting of the exclusive franchise to Sur-
tran was a governmental activity; accordingly, Continental
had no cause of action against the cities under the Sherman
Act.' Mindful of the blanket immunity the municipalities
enjoyed under the state action doctrine, the district judge
stated that "while one could question the wisdom of the cit-
ies' decision, one cannot question their legal right to imple-
ment that decision. ''69
III. THE EROSION OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITY:
CITY OF LAFA YETTE TO CITY OF BOULDER.
Although the state action immunity was generously ap-
- Id at 1260. E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d at 55;
Ladue Local Lines v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 483 F.2d at 137.
6, Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1260; E.W. Wiggins
Airways v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d at 1260; Ladue Local Lines v. Bi-State
Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d at 137.
2 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
Id.
Id at 360.
Surtran is a bus line jointly owned and operated by Dallas and Ft. Worth to pick
up passengers at DFW airport. Id.
-, Id. at 362. Continental also sought relief under the Federal Aviation Act, the
National Transportation Policy Act, the Interstate Commerce Act and the Texas anti-
trust laws. Id. at 362-68. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67 See supra notes 39, 43, 54-55 and accompanying text.
Continental Bus System v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. at 363.
- Id. at 360.
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plied, there were some circumstances which the United States
Supreme Court refused to exempt so-called "governmental
activities." In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,7 ° a minimum fee
schedule for attorneys was challenged as price fixing in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 7 Setting forth the "compulsion
test,"72 the Court denied state action immunity because the
state-related activity was not compelled by the state acting as
sovereign.7 3 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,'74 a retail druggist
filed suit against Detroit Edison, a private utility company,
complaining that Detroit Edison's policy of distributing free
light bulbs to consumers restrained trade in the sale of light
bulbs.75 Detroit Edison sought to invoke state action immu-
nity because the cost of distribution was reflected in rates ap-
proved by the state's public utility commission. 76 The Court
rejected this argument, and held that commission approval
was not a sufficient basis for exempting application of the an-
titrust laws.7 7 The Court's refusal to grant automatic state
action immunity to any governmental activity, no matter
how tangentially related to the state, clearly indicated the
70 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
1 Id at 775. The fee schedule was set by the Fairfax County Bar Association and
enforced by the Virginia State Bar. Id
72 The court stated:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is
state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is
whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign . . . . It
is not enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is "prompted" by state
action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction
of the State acting as a sovereign.
Id at 790-9 1. Criticism of the applicability of the "compulsion test" in the context of
municipalities stems from the fact that a state's broad delegation of powers to munici-
palities often distorts characterization of local activities as state-compelled. Comment,
Application ofthe State Action Doctrine to Municipalities, 79 Wis. L. REV. 570, 591 (1979);
See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 59-62 (Supp. 1982).
7 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 790-91.
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
Id at 581.
7, The Michigan Public Service Commission was the state regulatory body having
jurisdiction to regulate public utilities. Id
77 Id at 585. Cantor has been distinguished as to its applicability to municipal anti-
trust because Detroit Edison was a private antitrust defendant. See Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977). See also Comment, Application of the State Action Doc-
trine To Municipalities, supra note 72, at 592 (discussing the status of the antitrust de-
fendant as a test to define the state action exemption).
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Court's desire to restrict the Parker doctrine to activities in
which the state actually engages as a sovereign. Conse-
quently, in light of Goldfarb and Cantor, the decision in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 78 was not surprising. 79
In City of Lafayette, a plurality of the Court refused to ex-
tend automatic antitrust immunity to municipalities under
the state action doctrine. 8' The suit was brought by two cit-
ies, Lafayette and Plaquemine (which owned and operated
electric utility systems) against Louisiana Power & Light
Company (LP&L), a private utility company, and others. "'
The cities alleged that LP&L had committed various anti-
trust offenses which injured those operations of the city utili-
ties conducted beyond the city limits. 8 2  LP&L
counterclaimed that the cities committed antitrust violations
in the operation of their own utility companies.83 Claiming
the state action defense, Lafayette contended that the mere
status of the cities as governmental entities exempted them
7- 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
,5, See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (antitrust attack on the
Arizona Supreme Court's disciplinary rule against advertising by attorneys). Several
lower courts have similarly denied state action immunity to various "state-related"
activities. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 85 (1970), on remand, 376 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Mass. 1970), affd, 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1974) (deny-
ing state action immunity in relation to a competitive procurement by the city from a
dealer who lobbied the agency to change bidding specifications in the dealer's favor);
Allegheny Uniforms v. Howard Uniform Co., 384 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (no
immunity to designate sole supplier of uniforms for state employees); Azzaro v. Town
of Branford, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,337 (D. Conn. 1974)(no immunity regard-
ing city's purchase of insurance).
- City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 411-13.
- Id at 391. Lafayette's complaint also named Middle-South Utilities, Inc.; Central
Louisiana Electric Co., Inc.; and Gulf States Utilities, which were all corporations en-
gaged in the sale of electricity in Louisiana. Id at 391 n.3.
- Id at 392. Among the alleged offenses, the cities claimed that the defendants mo-
nopolized the electric utility market by engaging in boycotts against the cities and by
preventing the financing of construction of generating facilties beneficial to the cities
through sham litigation and other improper means. Id at 392 n.5.
- Id at 392. The counterclaim alleged that the cities had conspired to engage in
sham litigation against LP&L, to exclude competition by using long-term supply con-
tracts, and to displace LP&L by requiring customers of LP&L to buy electricity from
the cities as a condition of continued water and gas service. Id at 392 n.6.
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from the antitrust laws under Parker.84 Rejecting Lafayette's
reading of Parker as plain error, however, the Court stated
that the state action doctrine was based on the principle of
dual sovereignty wherein "a congressional purpose to subject
to antitrust control the State's acts of government will not
lightly be inferred." '85 The Court further stated that since cit-
ies are not sovereign, they do not receive the same level of
federal deference as do the states.86 Moreover, the Court ex-
pressed a fear of possible economic dislocation if cities were
allowed "to place their own parochial interests above the Na-
tion's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws."87 Ac-
cordingly, the Court refused to presume that Congress
intended to exclude anti-competitive municipal action from
the ambit of the antitrust laws. 8
The holding in City of Lafayette, however, did not totally
foreclose antitrust immunity to municipalities. The Court
recognized that a municipality may benefit from the state ac-
tion doctrine where it acts as an instrumentality of the state
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with the reg-
ulation or monopoly of a public service. 9 For a political sub-
division to assert a Parker defense, the Court stated that it
14 Id. at 408. The cities interpreted Parker to exempt all governmental entities,
whether state agencies or political subdivisions of the State. Id
.5 Id at 412 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351). See supra note 26 and accom-
panying text.
- City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 412.
H7 Id. at 412-13. The Court considered the threat to the efficiency of the free market
system. It stated: "If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled
solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive
effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds
with the comprehensive national policy Congress established." Id at 408.
- Id at 412-13. Lafayette also relied on a public service argument contending that
antitrust laws were not intended to apply to activities of a municipality whose exist-
ence is for the public benefit. Id at 403. Furthermore, Lafayette contended that anti-
trust regulation is unnecessary since the welfare of its citizens is protected by the
political process. Id at 405-06. The Court rejected the first aspect of this argument
because as a public corporation, a municipality's conduct is designed to benefit its
citizens which is not more likely to comport with the national economic well-being
than a private corporation acting in the interest of its shareholders. Id at 406. The
Court also rejected the political process aspect because aggrieved consumers living
outside of the municipality had no political recourse at the municipal level. Id at 403-
06.
R9 Id at 413.
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need not point to a specific detailed legislative authoriza-
tion.90 Instead "an adequate state mandate for anticompeti-
tive activities . . . exists when it is 'found from the authority
given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area,
that the legislature contemplated the kind of action com-
plained of.'-9'
In order to determine whether there is a sufficient state
mandate to displace the antitrust laws, the judicial inquiry
must focus not only on the statutes92 but also on legislative
history and state policy. 93 In New Motor Vehile Board v. Orrin
W. Fox Co. ,9' the Supreme Court applied the "legislative con-
templation" test9 5 of City of Lafayette and found a state policy
to displace competition where the challenged activity was a
necessary consequence of engaging in the authorized activ-
ity.96 Orrin W. Fox involved a California act which allowed
existing car dealers to restrict entry of new dealerships into
their market areas upon protest to the state's New Motor Ve-
-' Id at 415.
q, Id (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434
(1976)). The dissent by Justice Stewart argued that the plurality's emphasis on state
legislative action would greatly "impair the ability of a State to delegate governmental
power broadly to its municipalites." Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In his concur-
ring opinion, Chief Justice Burger proposed an alternate test based on whether the
activity engaged in by the municipality was proprietary or governmental in nature. Id.
at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice stated that a proprietary enterprise
engaged in by a municipality should not be exempt from the Sherman Act. Id. It
should be noted, however, that the state legislature can engage in proprietary as well as
governmental activity, thereby bestowing state action immunity to a proprietary activ-
ity which the Chief Justice states is not within the Parker doctrine. Id. Justice Stewart
criticizes this distinction as a "quagmire," in that proprietary and governmental action
are often indistinguishable. Id. at 433-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Indian Tow-
ing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955)). See generally Comment, supra note 72
at 596. See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW at 51 (Supp. 1982).
92 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 532 F.2d 431, 435 n.9 (5th Cir.
1976), affd, 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
" Comment, supra note 72, at 586.
94 439 U.S. 96 (1978). Orrin W Fox was decided only nine months after City of
Lafayette.
" See Comment, Apphcat'on of the State Action Doctrine to Municiaoahties, supra note 72 at
584 (discussing the pros and cons of the legislative intent test).
- P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 54 n.9 (Supp. 1982). Professor Areeda also suggests
that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the courts should "assume that the legisla-
ture intends the 'reasonable' but requires more specific language or legislative history
to justify the 'exceptional.' " Id. at 55.
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hicle Board. Although the statute did not expressly declare
an intent to displace competition, the Court nevertheless held
that the statute was outside of the antitrust laws under the
state action doctrine because the statutory scheme was a reg-
ulatory system "designed to displace unfettered business
freedom.'98
Orrin W. Fox exemplifies a broad construction of the "legis-
lative contemplation" standard. In Califomi'a Retail Liquor
Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,99 the Court began
to enforce a much stricter standard for antitrust immunity.
In Midcal, the Court expressly adopted a two-prong test:
"First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the
policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.' ' °
The Court found that California's wine pricing system satis-
fied the first prong of the test since the legislative policy
clearly states that its purpose was to permit resale price main-
tenance. °1 The program failed to satisfy the second prong,
however, because the state did not actively supervise the pro-
gram. 10 2 Consequently, the Court held that the entire pricing
system was in violation of the Sherman Act because the "na-
tional policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by
casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."' 10 3
Despite the rigidity of the "clear articulation and active
supervision" standard, some courts treated "home-rule""1 4
97 New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. at 98.
- Id. at 109. The Court further stated that "the Act does not lose this [state action]
exemption simply because, as part of its regulatory framework, it accords existing deal-
ers notice and opportunity to be heard before their franchisor is permitted to locate a
dealership likely to subject them to injurious and possibly illegal competition." Id. at
110.
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
- Id at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at
410).
I01 d
,02 Id The state merely enforced the price schedules established by private parties;
it did not review the reasonableness of the price schedules; it did not engage in moni-
toring of market conditions or review of the entire program. Id. at 105-106.
Id. at 106.
,0' See supra note 12.
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provisions of state constitutions as sufficient authorization for
anticompetitive municipal activity.' 0 5 But in Communt'o Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 10 6 the Court rejected this ar-
gument and drew a "bright-line" between home-rule
authorization and the required state authorization to qualify
for municipal antitrust immunity. In that case, the city of
Boulder passed an "emergency" ordinance which prohibitied
Community Communications Co. (CCC), an existing cable
television company, from expanding its business into otherareas of the city.' °7 The City Council announced that the
moratorium was necessary because CCC's continued expan-
sion during the drafting of a model cable television ordinance
would discourage potential competitors.'0 8 CCC filed for an
injunction, alleging that Boulder's restriction was in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 9 Boulder claimed the state
action immunity under Parker because Colorado's Home
Rule Amendment satisfied Midcal's "clear articulation and
affirmative expression" requirement."0 The city contended
that the Home Rule Amendment's "guarantee of local auton-
omy""' meant that its cable television regulation was "com-
prehended within the powers granted.""' 2 But the Court
rejected this contention because the Home Rule Amendment
or P. AREEDA, supra note 96, at 57 (citing Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Akron, 654 F.2d
1187 (6th Cir. 1981))(establishiment of waste disposal, recycling, and energy reconver-
sion project and prohibition on alternative disposal sites authorized by home-rule);
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982)(city authorized by home-rule to regulate cable television
franchises); Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1980),
afdon other grounds, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-352) (home-rule authority immunized city's regulation of airport
FBOs against antitrust claims).
,- 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
107 Id at 838.
-8 Id Because of the greatly improved cable television technology, CCC sought to
take advantage of the opportunity to expand its service to the entire city; however, the
city council chose to invite new competing businesses to enter the Boulder market. Id
at 835-38.
- Id at 838.
, Id at 842. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980). For a discussion of Midcal, see supra notes 99-103 and accompany-
ing text.
"I Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 842.
112 Id (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 415).
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was merely a neutral statement of the state's position with
respect to the challenged anticompetitive municipal activ-
ity." 3 The Court held that since the home rule relationship
between the state and the city's anticompetitive activity was
"one of precise neutrality," the "clear articulation and affirm-
ative expression" requirement was not satisfied." 14 Further-
more, the Court reinforced its position on municipal antitrust
liability and the basic limitation of the state action doctrine
by stating: "We are a nation not of 'city-states' but of
States.""'
It is important to note that the Court in Ciy of Boulder ex-
pressly left open the question whether a municipal defendant
must also satisfy the "active state supervision" test of Mid-
cal."'6 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, however, have held
"active state supervision" is not required in order for a mu-
nicipal defendant to benefit from a state action defense. In
Town of Halie v. City of Eau Claire,"1 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the City of Eau Claire's refusal
to provide sewage services to neighboring towns could not be
attacked under federal antitrust laws because neither com-
pulsion by state law nor active state supervision is required
when the defendant is a municipality." 8 Similarly, in Gold
Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, "9 the Court
Id. at 843.
Id. The Court also stated that in the phrase "contemplated within the powers
granted," the term "granted" implied affirmative addressing on the subject by the
State. Id Accordingly, a neutral statement embodied in home-rule amendments lacks
any affirmative address on a particular subject. Id.
,If, Id. (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704,
717 (10th Cir. 1980) (dissent), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982)). In the dissent, Justice
Rehnquist argues that the majority's opinion will radically alter the relationship be-
tween states and their political subdivisions by effectively destroying the home-rule
movement thereby leaving municipalities limited automomy over local concerns. Id. at
851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Freilich and Carlisle, The Community Communica-
tions Case. A Return To The Dark Ages Before Home Rule, 14 URB. LAW. at V (1982).
'" 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14. The Court stated that "because we conclude in the pres-
ent case that Boulder's moratorium ordinance does not satisfy the 'clear articulation
and affirmative expression' criterion, we do not reach the question whether that ordi-
nance must or could satisfy the 'active state supervision' test focused upon in Midcal.
Id
,,7 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 381-82.
". 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
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of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the implementa-
tion of a single operator ambulance service by the city fell
under the state action exemption because the active supervi-
sion requirement only applies when the defendants are pri-
vate entities or individuals. 12' Both courts recognized that
the active supervision requirement was meant to control po-
tential abuses, by private persons, of the authority conferred
upon them to make anticompetitive decisions and to further
insure that those decisions are consistent with the state policy
at stake.' 2' Moreover, as both courts reasoned, in the munic-
ipal defendant context, active supervision would be unneces-
sary because local governments operate pursuant to the
state's delegation of authority to engage in the challenged
conduct. 122 Lastly, the courts questioned the wisdom behind
imposing an active supervision requirement, since "[i]t would
seem rather odd to require municipal ordinances to be en-
forced by the state rather than the city itself."'' 23 Therefore, a
state action defense is available where a municipal defendant
can point to a clearly articulated and affirmative state policy
and this immunity is available even though active supervision
does not exist. 2
4
With the decision of City of Boulder, the law of municipal
antitrust did a "judicial about-face" from blanket immunity
for almost any anticompetitive governmental activity to lim-
ited immunity pursuant only to relatively strict requirements
of state authorization. The following section will focus on
municipal airport litigation after City of Lafayette to examine
not only the parallel application of the City of Layfayette/City of
2 Town offHalh'e, 700 F.2d at 384; Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1010.
Town offHalie, 700 F.2d at 384; Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1010.
,22 Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1014 (quoting P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 47
(Supp. 1982)).
",:2 Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d at 384 n. 17 (quoting Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Gold Cross Ambulance,
705 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.
Ct. 835, 851 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
,,,, Town offHalie, 700 F.2d at 384. The court in Town of Halhi limited its holding to
a local government performing a "traditional municipal function." Id Furthermore,
the court expressly reserved the question whether a municipality undertaking an an-
ticompetitive activity that falls outside the scope of a traditional governmental func-
tion must be actively supervised by the state. Id at n.18.
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Boulder critieria, but also to examine how a few courts have
circumvented this criteria.
IV. POST-CITY OF LAFAYETTE DECISIONS
In Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs,'25 the defendant cities at-
tempted to seek antitrust immunity under two separate state
laws. Suit was brought by independent taxicab drivers
against Dallas, Ft. Worth, and Surtran. Surtran was owned
and operated by the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth and was
the exclusive licensee granted the right to pick up taxicab
passengers at the DFW airport.126 Woolen and others alleged
a Section 1 violation and sought injunctive relief and treble
damages. 27 The cities' first contention was that a state policy
to displace competition with the taxicab regulation was ex-
pressed in the Texas Municipal Airport Act. 128 The District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, however, relied on a
provision of the Act which stated that no ordinance adopted
by a municipality should be inconsistent or contrary to Texas
or United States laws. 129 The court then held that the plain
12, 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
126 Id at 1027. Surtran Taxicabs was ajoint operation of Yellow Cab of Dallas and
Fort Worth Cab and Baggage Company. Id. Pursuant to an invitation for competitive
bids, the cities granted Surtran a permit to pick up passengers at DFW airport. Id.
Thereafter, both cities adopted ordinances providing that only holders of permits is-
sued by the Airport Board could provide ground transportation from the airport. Sur-
tran held the only permit. Id.
,11 Id. Treble damages is the measure of recovery for antitrust violations. The statute
provides: "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Award of treble damages is mandatory. See
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
12a 461 F. Supp. at 1031. The defendant cities cited article 46d-4 of the Texas Mu-
nicipal Airport Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN arts. 46d-1-22 (Vernon 1969) as evi-
dence of a state policy. This article provides as follows:
(a) In operating an airport . . . such municipality may . . . enter into
contract . . . and other arrangements . . . with any person
(2) conferring the privilege of supplying. . . services or facilities at such
airport . . . In each case the municipality may establish the terms and
conditions and fix the charges, rentals or fees for the privileges or
services. . ..
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4 (Vernon 1969).
- 461 F. Supp. at 1031. The provision states, "No ordinance, resolution, rule, regu-
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meaning of the provision led to the conclusion that the Texas
legislature did not contemplate anticompetitive actions by
municipal airport operators. 3 '
The cities alternatively relied on Texas' Home Rule legisla-
tion '3 as evidence of state policy to displace competition. 132
The court again rejected the cities' argument, stating that, at
most, the Home Rule provisions seem only to contemplate
public safety regulation of transportation. 33 Finally, the
court stated that antitrust immunity granted by virtue of the
Home Rule provisions would be a contradiction of the rea-
soning in City of Lafayette:
If these provisions are viewed as evincing a state policy to im-
plement the type of activity complained of here, then they
would afford almost blanket exemption from antitrust laws
for the activities of municipalities with regard to transporta-
tion. That is precisely the result that the Supreme Court
sought to avoid in Lafayette. /City of Lafayette/ did require greater
evidence of state policy that can be gleaned from /Texas' Home Rule
ActJ. 134
Thus, the Woolen court not only refused to find sufficient leg-
islative intent to allow municipalities to regulate airport taxi
service, but it also foreshadowed City of Boulder's refusal to
permit Home Rule municipalities to regain the blanket im-
munity lost in Cy of Lafayette. Moreover, it should be noted
that the circumstances in Woolen closely parallelled those of
lation or order adopted by a municipality pursuant to this Act shall be inconsistent
with or contrary to, any Act of the Congress of the United States or laws of this State,
or to any regulations promulgated or standards established pursuant thereto." TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-7(b)(Vernon 1969).
'o 461 F. Supp. at 1031.
" Texas' Home Rule Act granted full powers of local self-government including
powers:
12. To prohibit use of any street ... of the city ... without first ob-
taining the consent of goverment authorities ....
21. To regulate, license and fix the charges or fares made by any per-
son owning, operating, or controlling any vehicle of any character used
for the carrying of passengers for hire.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 1175 (Vernon 1963).




Continental Bus. 135 A comparison of these two cases reveals
that the opinion in City of Lafayette has effectively shifted the
burden of proof from the municipal antitrust plaintzjf'into the
municipal antitrust defendant, who must now prove the re-
quired state authorization. 136
In Pinehurst Airlines v. Resort Air Services, 137 the District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina increased the bur-
den of proof for municipalities. Instead of a statutory con-
struction favoring immunity, the court emphasized a state
legislative intent to confer antitrust liability. 138 The defend-
ant municipal Air Board claimed sufficient state authoriza-
tion for granting an exclusive FBO lease to Resort Air
Services under a municipal airport act 39 similar to that in
Woolen.' 40 The court relied on language of a particular sec-
tion of the airport act which authorized municipal airport
operators "to confer the privilege of concessions of supply
upon its airport goods, commodities, things, services and fa-
cilities; provided that in each case in so doing the public is not
deprived of its rightfuI, equal, and uniform use thereof."'' The
"rightful public use" language was construed by the court to
"clearly contemplate that limits of some sort will be placed"
on activities of municipally operated airports.' 42 Since the
statutory language gave rise to a proper inference of antitrust
scrutiny, the court concluded that the legislative intent be-
hind the provision neither directed nor authorized the Air-
port Board's grant of exclusive FBO status to Resort Air
-' Compare Continental Bus System v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Tex.
1974). For a discussion of Continental Bus System, see supra notes 62-69 and accompanying
text.
,1 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 417.
'17 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
- Id. at 554.
I'll The North Carolina statute provides: "Cities and towns authorized to establish
airports. That governing body of any city or town in this state is hereby authorized to
acquire, establish, construct, own, control, lease, equip, improve, maintain, operate,
and regulate airports . . . either within or without the limits of such cities and towns
. .N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-2 (1981).
476 F. Supp. at 553.
Id. at 554. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-53(3)(1981)(emphasis added).
' 476 F. Supp. at 554.
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Services.143 In holding that municipal antitrust liability was
proper, the court also stated that Resort Air Services' reliance
on the "legislative contemplation" standard was misplaced
because City of Lafayette required the defendant to show state
direction and authorization of the challenged activity.1
44
The Pinehurst court's inference of legislatively anticipated
antitrust scrutiny for municipal airport operators was based,
in part, on the great potential for anticompetitive abuses in-
herent in exclusive licensing of an FBO.' 45 But the potential
anticompetitive abuses are not limited only to exclusive li-
censing. The abuses may also arise in circumstances where
the municipal airport operators attempt to "squeeze out"
competitors. In Guthrie v. Genesee County, New York,' 146 a com-
peting FBO, Guthrie, alleged various anticompetitive activi-
ties such as a 100 percent increase in hanger rental rates and
an additional 100 percent surcharge, which eventually forced
Guthrie to leave the airport. 147 In addition to denying any
violation of antitrust laws, the defendant' 48 contended that
the Sherman Act was inapplicable because the challenged ac-
tivities were conducted pursuant to state legislative authori-
zation to restrict competition.1 49  The county relied on the
New York Municipal Airport Act which authorized the
county to "lease or sub-lease real property or lease, contract
or otherwise agree on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis for
the entire operation of such airport."'' 50 Although there was
authorization to enter into exclusive agreement, the District
Court for the Western District of New York held that the
-, Id at 555.
,,4 Id. at 554 n. 17. But see Town of Hale and Gold Cross Ambulance supra notes 116-
124 discussing the rejection of state direction with regard to a municipal defendant.
145 Id at 553.
"4 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
"' Id at 953. Other activities alleged were the county's refusal to allow Guthrie
"client information" or office space in the terminal; the forced removal from the main-
tenance hanger of all FBO's except for Prior Aviation, a co-defendant; the erection of a
snowfence which blocked Guthrie's access to the airport; and a refusal to allow fuel
receipt and delivery privileges to Guthrie. Id at 952-53.
"" The defendants were Genesee County and Prior Aviation Service, a competing
FBO. Id. at 952.
"4 Id at 953.
'-ld at 955 (citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 352(5) (McKinney 1974)).
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statutory language did not evidence that the legislature con-
templated the surcharge and rental increases.15' The
county's argument was rejected because it did not identify a
state regulatory concern and because there was no indication
of active supervision by the state as required by Midcal.15 2
Furthermore, the court utilized the same "public use guaran-
tee" analysis set forth in Pinehurst and concluded that the
state legislature intended to impose substantial limits on the
county's authority to operate an airport rather than confer
broad monopoly powers. 153
Despite the general view that municipal airport enabling
statutes are insufficient to confer state action immunity for a
municipality's anticompetitive actions, two recent lower
court decisions'54 have held otherwise based on reasoning
reminiscent of cases pre-dating City of Lafayette. Pueblo Aircraft
Service v. City of Pueblo -15' involved a familiar fact situation.
The plaintiff, Pueblo Aircraft, was an FBO doing business at
Pueblo Memorial Airport along with two other FBO's. 156
When Pueblo Aircraft's lease expired, the City of Pueblo
awarded it to a competitor, Pan-Ark, who was declared the
successful bidder. 157 Pueblo Aircraft claimed a Section 1 vio-
lation.5M The City defended by relying on the Colorado
County Airport enabling statute. 159 The Tenth Circuit held
Id at 956.
' ' For a discussion of Midcal see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. See also
Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981). The First Circuit held that pursuant to
Midcal, the defendant Public Transportation Authority failed to establish a "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" sovereign state policy favoring the Authority's
boycott of competitors in the parking market lot and that there was not active state
supervision. Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d at 37. More importantly, the court in Corey over-
ruled its decision in E. W. Wiggins as "no longer controlling on this issue." Id at 37 n.7.
494 F. Supp. at 957.
Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
151 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1982)(No. 83-352); All Am. Cab Co. v. Metropolitan
Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1982).
,,r 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 11,
1983) (No. 83-352).
" -Id at 807.
157 Id.
Ia Id
'19 Id The Colorado statute provides:
The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports
...the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, es-
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that the county airport statute was an "affirmative legislative
action" which granted the city an exemption from federal an-
titrust laws by declaring the operation of airports to be an
exercise of a governmental function for a public purpose and
in the public necessity." 6 Surprisingly, the court based its de-
cision on the governmental/proprietary activity distinction of
Chief Justice Burger in City of Lafayette, '6 a distinction which
has not achieved general recognition as the sole criteria in
state action inquiry.1 62 After correctly stating the law from
Parker to City of Boulder, the Tenth Circuit applied the "legis-
lative contemplation standard.1' 63 In applying the "legisla-
tive contemplation" standard, the court in Pueblo Aircraft
relied on E W. Wggtns, 64 which held that the Port Authority
was immune from antitrust laws because it was performing a
tablishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance,
equipment, and operation of airports . . . and the exercise of any other
powers granted . . . to any county, city and county, city or town are
hereby declared to be pubhc governmentalfinctons, exerciedfor a pubhc purpose,
and matters of pubhc necessity.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973) (emphasis added).
"- Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 809. The court also held that
under City of Boulder, exercise of powers granted to Pueblo under home rule authority
was not sufficient to satisfy state action standards required by Midcal. Id at 807.
',' City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). See supra note 73.1 for a discussion of Chief Justice Burger's concurrence.
"i See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 392-94.
(plurality ignored the district court's finding that the challenged activity was proprie-
tary); Pinehurst Airlines v. Resort Air Serv., 476 F. Supp. at 552 (commenting on City
of Lafayette plurality's view that state action inquiry was necessary regardless of the
nature of the activity, the court stated that "with due deference to the Chief Justice's
position, this Court is constrained to follow the approach suggested by the Lafayette
plurality."); Ladue Local Lines v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d at 135 (The court
expressly rejected this distinction as "a fallacy.").
16:1 Under the "legislative contemplation" test a political subdivision does not neces-
sarily have to point to a specific detailed legislative authorization. City of LaFayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 415. Instead, the requisite state mandate
exists where "[t]he legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of." Id. Ap-
parently, the Tenth Circuit interprets "the kind of activity" in broad terms, such as
airport operations, electric utilities, public transportation, etc. Based on the Supreme
Court's trend to require more specificity since City of Lafayette, however, the Tenth
Circuit's broad interpretation of "kind of activity" appears to be erroneous. The
Supreme Court probably interpreted "kind of activity" narrowly, e.g., the regulation of
FBOs, regulation of ground transportation at airports, price fixing of wine prices, etc.
- For a discussion of E W Wigins, see supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
But see Corey v. Look, discussed supra note 152 (overrulingE W. Wggins in light of Cy
of Lafayette and its progeny).
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governmental function.'65 The Pueblo Aircraft court's ration-
ale was based on the conclusion that the Colorado airport
statute clearly directed that the operation of municipal air-
ports be a governmental activity. 166 Since regulation of FBO's
is within the scope of normal airport operations, the activity
challenged was held to be within the legislative intent.1 67
Moreover, the court stated that "in its 'governmental capac-
ity' a municipality acts as an arm of the state for the public
good on behalf of the state rather than itself."' 168 Finally, it is
important to note that the Tenth Circuit granted state action
immunity without requiring a showing of active state
supervision. 16
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning, however, would seem to fall
short of the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of state action
since its decision in City of Lafayette. 170 As Midcal expressly re-
affirmed, the governmental nature of the municipal activity
alone is insufficient to constitute state action because this
doctrine requires that the challenged activity be affirmatively
authorized by the state in its sovereign capacity.171 Gener-
ally, it is for the state to implement the regulatory policy and
the municipality to administer that state policy as an instru-
mentality of the state. 7 2  Under Colorado's present system,
the anticompetitive activity is initiated by the municipality
' See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
"' 679 F.2d at 811.
Id. at 809-11. The court also stated that the airport is operated for the general
public and not for the particular advantage of Pueblo inhabitants. Id This argument
is apparently to distinguish City of Lafayette, where the plurality stated that a munici-
pality functions in the interests of its citizens which may often be at odds with national
policy. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406-08. If what the Tenth Circuit says of airports is
true, then all airports are necessarily for the benefit of the general public because the
primary purpose of air transportation is long distance travel.
" Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810.
,61 See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text discussing Town ofHalie and Gold
Cross Ambulance.
,,0 See supra notes 110-153 and accompanying text.
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105.
See also Town of Halhe; Gold Cross Ambulance supra notes 96.1-96.9 and accompanying
text.
,72 "[Mlunicipal corporations are instrumentalities of the State for the convenient
administration of government within their limits." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 413. (quoting Louisianaexre. Folsom v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883)).
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under general airport enabling act powers which the state
legislature declares to be governmental. Arguably, this con-
stitutes a governmental act of the municipality, not a govern-
mental act of the state. As the Court in Mdcal stated, "The
national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted
by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement."' 17 3 Nev-
ertheless, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
to the petition in Pueblo Aircrafl. 74
V. AVOIDANCE OF MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY: AN
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
In terms of antitrust law coverage, the operators of munici-
pal airports have experienced a virtual about-face from a pe-
riod of blanket municipal antitrust immunity to the present
policy of general municipal antitrust liability with only a nar-
row exception under the "clear articulation and affirmative
expression" standard. This turnaround may hinder the effi-
cient operation of municipal airports by their owners and op-
erators who must make decisions under an ominous cloud of
antitrust liability. 7 5 The Tenth Circuit's liberal interpreta-
tion of state action in Pueblo Aircraft, however, may indicate a
standard which permits federal courts to find the required
state legislative mandate from the broad enabling statutes
which authorize operation of the nation's municipal airports.
But if a court does find that the airport activity is not entitled
California Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 106.
" 51 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983)(No. 82-352). In All-American Cab Co. v.
Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Auth., 547 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), the plain-
tiff taxi cab companies alleged that the airport's exclusive ground transportation serv-
ices dispatcher discriminated among taxi services and monopolizing ground
transportation at the airport. The court, however, held that the airport authority was
exempted from antitrust laws because TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-4-102 (1980) declares
the airport authority's purpose to be governmental. All American Cab, 547 F. Supp. at
511. The court primarily relied on Peblo Aircraft and Padgett (a pre-Citp of Lafaytte
decision). Id For a discussion of Padgett, see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
" Of course, activities of municipalities in general are affected; however, the focus
of this article is on airport activities. Cf City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("But a city contemplating such [monopo-
lized public service] action in the interest of its citizens will be able to do so . . . only at
the risk of discovering too late that a federal court believes that insufficient statutory
direction existed. ... ).
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to immunity from antitrust scrutiny, the substantive issue still
must still be resolved: whether the activity challenged did in
fact violate the Sherman Act. Finally, as a corollary to the
substantive issue, the court must decide what sanctions are
available against a municipal defendant.
A. The Pueblo Aticraft Standard
Pueblo Azrcraft '76 stands for the proposition that if state leg-
islation directs airport operation to be a governmental func-
tion for a public purpose and in the public necessity, and the
activity complained of is within the scope of the airport's nor-
mal operation, then the airport is immune under the state
action doctrine. 77 The factor distinguishing the operating of
municipal airports from other municipal functions is that air-
ports benefit the general public, 78 while an activity such as
the operating of an electric utility primarily benefits the mu-
nicipality's own citizens.' 79 Under the Pueblo Aircraft stan-
dard, airport operators are able, in a practical sense, to
achieve the same high level of operational freedom from anti-
trust scrutiny that was once available before City of Lafayette.
In pre-City of Lafayette cases, 180 the courts looked to statutory
language to determine the nature of the airport's function: if
its activity was declared a governmental function, the airport
was granted automatic immunity because Parker held that
antitrust laws do not apply to governmental actions. 181 The
Pueblo Aircraft standard apparently would operate in the same
manner.
The primary element of the Pueblo Aircraft standard is that
the state must clearly direct that airport operations be gov-
679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 809-11. For a discussion of
Pueblo Aircraft, see supra notes 155-174 and accompanying text.
"a Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 11. See supra note 170.
,79 Cf City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 404. The Court
stated that the municipal utility's practices "would provide maximum benefits for its
constituents, while disserving the interests of. . .captive customers outside its jurisdic-
tion." Id.
- See supra notes 175-69 and accompanying text.
M~ Id
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ernmental for a public purpose and in the public necessity." 2
The broadness of this standard lies in the fact that many
states, in addition to Colorado, have similar airport acts con-
taining the requisite statutory language. For example, the
Texas Municipal Airports Act provides that the:
[O]peration, regulation, protection, and policing of airports
. . . and [of] air navigation facilities, including the acquisi-
tion or elimination of airport hazards and the exercise of any
other powers herein granted to municipalities and other pub-
lic agencies, to be severally or jointly exercised, are hereby
declared to be pubh'c and governmental function, exercised for a pubhc
purpose, and matters of pubh'c necessit .... 183
This is the same airport act which the Woolen court regarded
as being insufficient proof of legislative contemplation to in-
voke state action immunity.18 1 Pursuant to the Pueblo Ai'rcraft
standard, however, a Texas airport would be granted anti-
trust immunity because the Texas legislature declared the op-
eration of municipal airports to be governmental functions
exercised for a public purpose and in matters of public neces-
sity. Therefore, so long as the challenged anticompetitive ac-
tivity is within the normal scope of airport operations, Texas
municipal airports are allowed to function under the um-
brella of state action immunity as interpreted by Pueblo
Aircrafl. '8 5
' See Pueblo Aircraft Serv., 679 F.2d at 811.
" TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 46d-15 (Vernon 1969) (emphasis added). The
California Aeronautics Act similarly provides:
[T]he planning acquisition, establishment, construction, improvement,
maintenance, equipment, and operation of airports and air navigation
facilities, whether by the State separately or jointly with any political
subdivision, and the exercise of any other powers granted to the depart-
ment by this part are public and governmental functions, exercised for a
public purpose, and are matters of public necessity.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21004 (Supp. 1982).
,94 Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 461 F. Supp. at 1031. For a discussion of Woolen,
see supra notes 125-136 and accompanying text.
19r, It is submitted that those airports which are not statutorily declared to be exercis-
ing governmental functions will most likely be denied the state action immunity be-
cause, in the absence of express statutory direction, the operation of a municipal
airport is generally a proprietary function. See Pueblo Aircraft Service v. City of
Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 810-11. See, e.g., Pinehurst Airlines v. Resort Air Service, 476 F.
Supp. 548 (M.D.N.C. 1979), discussedsupra in notes 137-144 and accompanying text;
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In order to come under the Pueblo Aircraft standard, the ac-
tivity must also come within the normal scope of airport op-
erations.'86 This requirement is consistent with Justice
Steven's opinion in Cantor '8 7 that an implied exemption from
federal antitrust laws will be granted "only to the minimum
extent necessary."' 88 To define which activities are within
the normal scope of airport activities, one commentator has
suggested a distinction between central and subsidiary activ-
ity in assessing potential antitrust liability. 8 9 A central air-
port activity is one which "must encompass the power to
engage in those pursuits necessary to enable the airport au-
thority to fulfill its legislative obligation to provide airport
services."'" Subsidiary activities are those which provide a
broad range of services that cater more to the convenience of
travelers rather than to their safe departure and arrival.' 9 '
Some typical subsidiary activities include car rental services,
hotel accomodations, restaurants, bars, food and beverage
concessions, newsstands, and gift shops.'92 The antitrust im-
plication attached to this distinction is that the subsidiary ac-
tivity's connection with legislative authorization is more
tenuous, thereby increasing the potential for antitrust liabil-
ity.' 93 Conversely, as one commentator stated, "the more
Guthrie v. Genesee County, N.Y., 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) discussed supra
notes 146-155 and accompanying text.
- Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 809.
117 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), discussed supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text. Professor Rogers, a noted antitrust authority, points out that the
"minimum extent necessary" test of Cantor does not flow from Parker. Rather, this test
has its origins in situations involving a conflict between federal regulatory policy and
the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the preemption analysis basis of Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion of City of Boulder was foreshadowed in 1978 by Professor Rogers
when he stated that "Cantor represents the first attempt to transpose this [state action]
standard to conflicts between state regulation and federal antitrust policy." Rogers, The
State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. CoLO. L. REV. 147, 166 (1978). See supra note 27,
for a discussion of the federal preemption/exemption debate.
- 428 U.S. at 597.
,, Hermann, supra note 1 at 353.
Id. at 355-56. Examples of central activities include maintenance of runways and
terminals, securing of FBO services and other activities which provide for safe takeoff
and landing of airplanes, and the accomodation of passengers. Id. at 355.
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central an activity is to the establishment and operation of an
airport, the more likely it is to be found within the legislative
mandate or authorization of the airport authority." '94
This central/subsidiary distinction would serve the pur-
pose of providing some sort of benchmark for both the mu-
nicipal airport operators and the judiciary to determine
whether a particular activity falls within the Pueblo Aircraft
standard. The more central the activity, the more likely it is
that the legislature contemplated the activity to be within the
operative scope of its airport act. The drawback to this dis-
tinction is that the exact scope of a central activity is difficult
to ascertain. 95
Ground transportation and FBO leases are activities which
the courts have declared to be central to the operation of an
airport. 96 All of the municipal airport antitrust cases previ-
ously discussed are either suits arising out of ground transpor-
tation regulation 197 or those arising out of FBO regulation.'98
These cases represent recurrent fact situations in which the
municipality is a facility operator granting an exclusive privi-
lege.' 99 Since most, if not all, of the major airport antitrust
litigation concerns regulation of central activities, the defend-
ant airports have a substantial defense under the Pueblo Air-
' Id at 355.
See, e.g., Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bb., 492 F.2d at 1260 ("the
regulation of ground transportation services is necessarily incident to the management
and operation of the airport facilities"); E. W. Wiggins Airways v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 362 F.2d at 53 n.2 ("A fixed based operation is vital to air transportation").
-' See Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978), dtscussed
supra in note 125-136 and accompanying text; Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Civ. 1974), discussedsupra in notes 49-59 and accompa-
nying text; Continental Bus System v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp 359 (N.D. Tex.
1974), discussed supra in notes 62-69 and accompanying text. Ladue Local Lines, v. Bi-
State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970), discussed supra in notes 42-48 and
accompanying text.
- See Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), di's-
cussedsupra in notes 155-174 and accompanying text; Guthrie v. Genesee County, N.Y.,
494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), discussedsupra in notes 146-153 and accompanying
text; Pinehurst Airline, v. Resort Air Service, 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.C.N.C. 1979), ds-
cussedsupra in notes 137-144 and accompanying text; E.W. Wiggins Airways v. Massa-
chusetts Port Auth., 261 F.2d (1st Cir. 1966), dtscussed supra in notes 30-41 and
accompanying text.
1- See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 66 (Supp. 1982).
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craft standard. The availability of this defense may eventually
tip the scales in favor of the defendant airports by virtually
negating the restraints of City of Lafayette and its progeny. The
municipal airport operator, however, may also decide to
grant exclusive privileges to provide a service which is ques-
tionable as to the centrality of its relation to necessary airport
operations, i.e., a subsidiary activity. In such case, a fact-sen-
sitive determination is required to define the airport's opera-
tive scope and to ascertain whether the subsidiary service is
an activity within the legislative intent of the state airport
act. If the activity is determined to be outside the scope of
the airport's operations and therefore outside of the Pueblo
Aircraft standard, then the airport operator may be subject to
antitrust scrutiny under the rigid "clear articulation and ac-
tive supervision" requirement of Midcal. Nevertheless, if the
municipal airport operator is involved in an antitrust action,
the suit will most likely arise out of the recurrent fact situa-
tion of ground transportation or FBO regulation creating an
exclusive licensee. Because both ground transportation and
FBO service are well-settled central activities,2°° the airport
operators should not be overburdened with judicial antitrust
scrutiny since immunity is available under the Pueblo Aircraft
standard.
B. Procurement of State Authorization
Another method for an airport operator to avoid antitrust
liability is procurement of state authorization for the poten-
tially anticompetive activity. For a regulatory municipal or-
dinance to be exempt under the state action doctrine, the
ordinance or activity must satisfy one of the following two
criteria:
1) constitute action by the state itself in its sovereign ca-
pacity; or
2) i) constitute municipal action in furtherance or imple-
mentation of clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy to displace competition; and
" See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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ii) There must be active state supervision.20 1
Since the airport operator is a municipality, Town ofJHal'e
and Gold Cross Ambulance require only that there be a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to dis-
202place competition. Active state supervision would not be
required.0 3 Whether this standard is properly satisfied neces-
sarily requires inquiry into state legislation to find the elusive
state policy to displace competition. The inquiry must reveal
state authorization for the municipality's anticompetitive ac-
tions.204 The test used to find the necessary legislative man-
date is from City of Lafayette,20 5 in which the Court held "that
an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities of
cities and other subordinate governmental units exists when
it is found from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of."'20 6 The search for a
legislative mandate will involve the legislative history of the
statute, as well as the statutory language itself. The major
drawback of the "legislative contemplation" test is the ab-
sence of legislative history in most states, thereby making the
search for a "clear expression" of state policy difficult when it
is not evident on the face of the act.20 7
Despite the lack of legislative history, statutory authoriza-
tion of airport regulatory activity is the source of immunity
most often relied upon by municipal operators. The Pueblo
Aircraft standard represents an alternative source, but statu-
tory authorization rests on a more solid foundation pursuant
to Supreme Court cases from City of Lafayette to City of Boulder.
Statutory authorization is the most reliable source of immu-
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
-2 For a discussion of Town of Halhe and Cold Cross Ambulance see supra notes 116-124
and accompanying text.
- Id.
Professor Areeda emphasized the role of state authorization. He stated: "authori-
zation helps distinguish state policy displacing antitrust laws from decisions made by
subordinate governmental entities which have not been removed by the state from
antitrust scrutiny. ... P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 371 (Supp. 1982).
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
Id at 415.
o7 Hermann, supra, note I at 371.
nity only so long as there is "clear articulation and affirma-
tive expression" by the state. Under the statutory
authorization approach, airport authorities must use a hind-
sight approach, i.e., the airport authority which implements
a potentially anticompetitive program must fall back on the
airport enabling act and hope that a state policy to allow the
airport to so act was clearly articulated by the state legisla-
tion. 2°8 As seen in decisions such as Woolen v. Surtran Taxi
cabs,20 9 however, airport enabling acts are usually set out in
terms too general to satisfy claims of "clear articulation and
affirmative expression. '"210
The prudent alternative for the foresighted municipal air-
port operator is to procure specific state authorization for
those activities which may be potentially anticompetitive to
the extent that antitrust scrutiny is warranted. Accordingly,
before the municipal airport operator acts, he should have
procured specific legislative authorization. In light of the
"clear articulation and affirmative expression" standard, the
following rule of thumb is advised: the more specific and di-
rect the legislative mandate, the more likely the antitrust suit
court will be to find that the municipality or airport author-
ity is exempt from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.
The precision demanded of the statutory authorization re-
quires: 1) the legislation must authorize the challenged activ-
ity and 2) that the legislature must do so with the intent to
displace antitrust laws. 21' This rule of thumb merely recog-
nizes that "it will be necessary for a court to find that the
legislation invoked by airport authorities explicitly or implic-
See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 841.
461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
2,0 See supra notes 125-152 and accompanying text. One commentator observed how
the antitrust trap was set:
It should be remembered that most airports have been organized and
operated under statutory schemes developed while the Parker v. Brown
opinion was thought to provide very broad immunity for governmental entities and
that it is somewhat unfair to now scrutinize these statutes very closely for explicit
statements of authorization and a mandate for engaging in activities which were
implity recognized by the various state legislatures as necessary or desirable for the
operation of airports authorized to be established for public convenience and necessity.
Hermann, supra note 1, at 370.
21 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 413.
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itly mandates the exercise of monopoly powers in the estab-
lishment or operation of the airport. '21 2
Procurement of specific legislative authorization, however,
has drawbacks with regard to its practical applicability. A
substantial problem is the fact that any act by the airport
operator is anticompetitive to some extent. Consequently,
any act may be open for challenge as anticompetitive in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. For example, a losing bidder for
an FBO lease at an airport may bring an antitrust suit alleg-
ing a conspiracy in restraint of trade against the airport
board and the winning bidder.1 3 Another drawback to pro-
curement is the inherent inefficiency of petitioning the state
legislature for special legislation on every occasion the airport
operator may decide to implement some potentially monopo-
listic activity. But this procurement process may be what the
plurality in Cz*v of Lafayette intended when it stated that mu-
nicipalities may conduct anticompetitive acts only as an in-
strumentality of the state.21 4
C. Municipal Antitrust Liability:. The Substantive Issue
City of Lafayette and its progeny dealt only with the thresh-
old question of antitrust immunity for municipalities. The
mere fact that certain activities by the municipalities may no
longer qualify under state action immunity does not necessar-
ily mean that such actions actually violate the Sherman Act.
The plurality in City of Lafayette merely held that a munici-
pality's status as a governmental entity does not entitle it to
an automatic exemption under the state action doctrine.2t 5
Moreover, the plurality expressly reserved the question of an-
' Hermann, supra, note I at 372. See supra notes 125-152 and accompanying text.
But see Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), discussedsupra in notes 155-174 and
-accompanying text.
-, See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), discussedsupra in notes 155-
174 and accompanying text; Guthrie, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980), d cussed supra
in notes 146-153 and accompanying text; E W Wiggins, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966),
discussed supra in notes 30-41 and accompanying text, See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAW 56 (Supp. 1982).
21 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 413.
2 1 Id at 408.
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titrust liability. 216 Once it is determined that the airport does
not qualify for state action immunity, the trial court must
still resolve the substantive issue of whether the municipal de-
fendant did in fact violate the Sherman Act.2 17
Despite having incidental effects on market competition,
many challenged activities do not violate the antitrust laws.
Without incurring antitrust liability, a private corporation
has the right to grant an exclusive franchise21 8 and has a free
choice to refuse to deal with any concessionaire in an area.21 9
A state subdivision also has the right to grant exclusive
licenses at an airport since antitrust laws are equally applica-
ble to governmental entities. 220  Accordingly, although the
political subdivision is not immune from antitrust liability, it
does not necessarily follow that a substantive violation exists
because both a subdivision and a corporation are "persons"
within the antitrust laws22' who may grant exclusive licenses
without violating the Sherman Act.2 2
Furthermore, a municipal airport operating without bene-
fit of state action immunity may be challenged on an activity
which does not have a sufficient nexus to meet the require-
ments of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act requires that a
defendant municipality's activities have a direct and substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce. 223 In United States v. Yellow
Cab ,224 the United States sought to restrain a monoply of tax-
icab services conveying railroad passengers to and from rail-
way stations. The Supreme Court held that plaintiff failed to
state a claim under the Sherman Act:
2,1 Id at 402. See also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.
Ct. at 843 n.20 ("We do not confront the issue of remedies appropriate against munici-
pal officials").
217 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 52-53 (Supp. 1982).
2', Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2,, 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 263 (1974). Professor Areeda
states that "as operator of a facility, even a private monopolist is allowed by the anti-
trust laws to have a single [exclusive] concessionaire." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
64 (Supp. 1982).
- Community Communications Co. v. City of Pueblo, 102 S. Ct. at 843.
221 Id See City of Lafyaette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 397.
222 Cf Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
22 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
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[w]hen local taxicabs merely convey interstate train passen-
gers between their homes and the railroad station in the nor-
mal course of their independent local service, that service is
not an integral part of interstate transportation. And a re-
straint on or monopoly of that general local service, without
more, is not proscribed by the Sherman Act.22 5
Therefore, a monopoly of the ground transportation services
at an airport is not sufficiently connected to interstate com-
merce to invoke the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Ac-
cordingly, in a situation such as that in Woolen v. Surtran
Taxicabs, 2 6 in which cities monopolized the taxicab services
at Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport, a court would not
reach the question of antitrust liability. Although the cities
would be denied state action immunity, the suit probably
would be decided in favor of the airport operators because
the substantive inquiry of antitrust liability would lead to dis-
missal under United States v. Yellow Cab.
In assessing municipal antitrust liability, the courts use
either the per se rule or the rule of reason to determine
whether an unreasonable restraint of trade exists in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 227 These are the same tests
used when there is a private defendant. The rule of reason
inquires into "whether the restraint merely regulates and per-
haps promotes competition or whether it suppresses or even
destroys competition. '22  The per se rule declares certain ac-
tivities as unreasonable as a matter of law under Section 1.229
225 Id at 233.
22 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
22 Beane, The Anitnist Imphcatrns ofAirhie Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1001,
1013-17 (1980).
2 Id at 1014. Certain relevant factors taken in account by the rule of reason
include:
(1) Facts particular to the business;
(2) The condition of the businesses before and after the restraint;
(3) The nature of the restraint and its effect;
(4) History of the restraint; and,
(5) The reason and purpose for adopting the restraint.
d (quoting Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 238 (1918)).
22 Id The rationale for theper se rule is that such types of conduct "have a perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue . Id. (citing North-
ern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1 (1958)).
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Judicially recognized per se violations of Section 1 are price
fixing, market division or allocation, group boycott and tying
arrangements. 2 3 °
Both the rule of reason and the per se rule were judically
created in a private business activity context;231 accordingly,
application of either rule in the public municipality context
requires certain modifications to compensate for the private
public distinction. The first modification is that theperse rule
should not be applicable to municipalities.232 As a public
corporation, the municipality generally acts in the public in-
terest.233 Upon engaging in one of the per se violations, how-
ever, the municipality will not be allowed to proffer any
public benefit justification if theper se rule applied.234 Theper
se rule was created in a private business context where profit-
maximization concepts lead to plainly anticompetitive con-
duct which is "without redeeming value. ' 235 In contrast, the
municipality's conduct, which is generally non-competition
based, will have "redeeming virtues" such as broad public
benefit and even some possibly pro-competitive effects. 236 Use
of the per se rule denies consideration of these virtues.
The rule of reason is the more desirable rule to apply to a
municipal antitrust defendant because it takes into account
2V Id. at 1014-15.
2., See Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution" In Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 ILL. B.J. 684,
684-85 (1982).
2.2 Id.
233 Municipal officials, however, who violate the antitrust laws in an individual ca-
pacity will be characterized as engaging in a private conspiracy in restraint of trade
instead of engaging in a governmental function. Curtin, Antirust Comes To The Cities -
Anal.yst of Ct'ty of Lafayette v. Loustjna Power & Light Co. and its Effect on MumcipalAntitrust
Liabih'y, 5 UDAYTON L. REV. 7 (1979). For a discussion of the availability of a good
faith defense for municipal officials see 3 K. DENNIS, MODERN PERSPECTIVES OF FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAW 69-86 (Supp. 1983).
231 Once aperse violation is established, "no economic evidence will be received as to
the precise harm they caused or the business excuse for their use." Beane, supra note
227 at 1014. See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d at 806 (where
the city's lease agreement required all FBOs to purchase all aviation fuel to be used at
the airport). If, however, the city was denied antitrust immunity, the court would have
to exclude any justification for the per se violation when deciding on the question of
antitrust liability. Therefore, the city would have been guilty of a Section 1 violation as
a matter of law.
2. Hoskins, supra note 231 at 684-85.
236 Id
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the relevant circumstances of the type of conduct.237 More-
over, the rule of reason takes into account the public nature
of the municipality because injury to the public must be es-
tablished before a restraint will be held to violate this stan-
dard of liability. 238  But since most of the relevant
considerations were developed in the private defendant con-
text, 239 the rule of reason should be modified slightly to ac-
commodate the municipality's public status. One
commentator has suggested that unless the municipality's
conduct falls within aper se category, "the ultimate resolution
of antitrust issues will depend on an application of the rule of
reason, which involves weighing the social harms and bene-
fits, and consideration of less restrictive alternatives for
achieving the desired benefits. ' 24 ° The most important dis-
tinction between the rule of reason and the per se rule is that
the rule of reason allows the courts to recognize that whether
the activity is violative of the Sherman Act may depend on
the status of the defendant. One court noted: "it may be that
certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive when
engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion
when adopted by a local government. 24
1
D. Municipal Antitrust Sanctions
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
availability of damages or other sanctions against public anti-
trust defendants.242 In City of Boulder, the most recent munici-
pal antitrust decision, the Court again passed on this issue
stating that "this case's preliminary posture makes it unnec-
essary for us to consider other issues regarding the applicabil-
ity of the antitrust laws in the context of suits by private
litigants against government defendants. '243 The Court,
27 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
2.1 See Beane, supra note 227, at 1014.
: See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
o Curtin, supra note 233, at 36.
21. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 417 n.48).
W2 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 48 (Supp. 1982).
21. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20.
however, did state that antitrust laws, like other federal laws
imposing civil and criminal sanctions on "persons," also ap-
ply to municipalities.244 Accordingly, the antitrust sanctions
available against private defendants are presumably avail-
able against municipalities.
Both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act provide that a
violation shall be deemed a felony.245 Corporate violations
are punishable by a fine in the maximum amount of one mil-
lion dollars.246 Violations by individuals are punishable by
three years imprisonment or a fine in the maximum amount
of one hundred thousand dollars.
247
The civil sanctions for violations are potentially the most
devastating consequences for both private and public anti-
trust defendants. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for
treble damages. It states: "A person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefrom . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including reasonable attorney's fee."' 248 In addition to treble
damages, private injunctive relief may be had under Section
16 of the Clayton Act, which provides that "any person, firm,
corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or damage
by violation of the antitrust laws.
249
The spectrum for antitrust sanctions against municipal de-
fendants is fairly broad, ranging from criminal conviction to
treble damages. It is submitted that antitrust liability for mu-
nicipalities should be limited to the granting of-injunctive re-
lief. Taking into account the public nature of the
2.. Id at 843.
245 Section 1 provides: "every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
211i U.S. §§ 1,2 (1976).
247 Id.
24H 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
149 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
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municipality, it is doubtful that Congress meant to include
state entities within the realm of the criminal and treble dam-
age provisions. The dissent in Cy of Lafayette pointed out that
awards of treble damages against a municipality could cause
the bankruptcy of even a large city.250 Although the plurality
in City of Lafayette suggested that treble damages might not be
appropriate against a municipality, 251 the simple fact remains
that under the Clayton Act treble damages are mandatory.252
Even if treble damages do not bankrupt a city, such liabil-
ity is ultimately the burden of the city's taxpayers. Treble
damages are appropriate against private corporations where
the stockholders voluntarily assumed the risk by buying into
the company. 53 In contrast, a defendant municipality's tax-
payers have no choice but to pay the necessary taxes to ab-
sorb the trebled liability. 254
Professor Areeda, a noted antitrust authority, argues that
"it appears very doubtful that Congress intended to subject
state or local government to federal control through criminal
punishment of public officials or treble damages payable to
private parties out of the public treasury. ' 25 5 Federal control
as described would violate the very principles of federalism
on which the state action doctrine was founded in Parker v.
Brown.256 Moreover, this type of federal control would have a
chilling effect on the willingness of municipalities to provide
new or innovative public services. In limiting municipal anti-
trust sanctions to injunction of future anticompetitive con-
duct, the courts will still be able to "effectuate federal
antitrust policy, safeguard the competitive rights of private
parties and avoid placing an unduly harsh burden upon
2,,) City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). The plaintiff in City of Lafayette claimed $180 million in damages against
the two cities. A trebled amount equalling $540 million would most likely bankrupt
the two cities which had a combined population of a mere 75,000. Id.
,,' Id at 401-02 and n.22.
2 Id. at 440. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
21:1 Hoskins, supra note 231, at 687.
254 Id
-, P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 48 (Supp. 1982).




The dissent in City of Boulder suggested a federalism ap-
proach to deal with the question of sanctions on municipali-
ties for violations of the antitrust laws. Justice Rehnquist
contended that the state action doctrine is a preemption doc-
trine founded on the principles of federalism and the
Supremacy Clause.258 In support of his deviation from the
generally accepted view that state action is an exemption
doctrine, Justice Rehnquist stated:
[Parker v. Brown] is clearly the language of federal preemption
under the Supremacy Clause . . . . There was no language
of "exemption" either express or implied, nor the usual in-
cantation that "repeals by implication are disfavored." In-
stead, the Court held that state regulation of the economy is
not necessarily preempted by the antitrust laws even if the
same acts by purely private parties would constitute a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.259
Justice Rehnquist contended that the majority misconstrued
the Parker doctrine as an exemption from the Sherman Act.
He further stated that the issue in state action is not whether
the anticompetitive municipal ordinance is exempt from the
Sherman Act but "whether [the] statutes, ordinances, and
regulations enacted as an act of government are preempted by
the Sherman Act under the operation of the Supremacy
Clause. '26
The benefit derived by using the preemption analysis is
that a state statute or municipal ordinance in conflict with
the Sherman Act will be deemed preempted under the
Supremacy Clause.2 6 1 On the other hand, an exemption
analysis runs into problems of whether a municipality may be
17 Comment, Mum'ibal Antitrust Liability: Applying City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 563, 581 (1979).
2- Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). See generally, Rogers, Municipal Antitrust In A Federalist System, 80
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305 (1908).
259 102 S. Ct. at 847.
- Id at 845 (emphasis added).
.... Id at 846-47.
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liable under the per se rule2 62 and whether a municipality is
liable for treble damages 263 for enacting anticompetitive ordi-
nances not exempted by the Parker doctrine.264 Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that "since a municipality does not violate
the antitrust laws when it enacts legislation preempted by the
Sherman Act, there will be no problems with the remedy.




Prior to Cz*y of Lafaye/le, operators of municipal airports en-
joyed blanket immunity from antitrust scrutiny predicated
on a finding of a governmental cloak for the challenged an-
ticompetitive activity. After the Court in City of Lafayette re-
fused to grant automatic immunity to municipalties by virtue
of their status as governmental entities, courts routinely de-
nied antitrust immunity to airport operators. The general air-
port enabling acts were held to be an insufficient legislative
mandate to conduct the challenged anticompetitive practices.
The rationale in Pueblo Aircrafi, however, may be a new source
of broad antitrust immunity for airport operators so long as
the state legislation specifies that airport operations are gov-
ernmental functions for a public purpose and in the public
necessity. Also, the anticompetitive activity challenged must
be central to necessary airport operations since the immunity
granted is only to the minimum extent necessary.
The threshold question of antitrust immunity must be kept
in perspective. The mere fact that some municipal activity
fails to qualify for state action immunity does not necessarily
mean that its conduct is in violation of the antitrust laws.
After the threshold immunity question, the substantive issue
of whether the municipality did in fact violate the antitrust
laws must be determined before antitrust sanctions are im-
posed. Moreover, to assess a substantive antitrust violation,
- See supra notes 231-241 and accompanying text.
2:' See supra notes 250-257 and accompanying text.
211 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 848.
- Id at 848 n.4.
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the courts should only apply the rule of reason to the munici-
pal defendant. If antitrust liability is found to be appropri-
ate, the sanction imposed on municipalities should be limited
to an injunction of future anticompetitive actions. This equi-
table remedy should be imposed to the exclusion of criminal
and monetary sanctions which will unduly burden the mu-
nicipal defendant. Finally, adoption of the federal preemp-
tion analysis in place of the exemption analysis would
alleviate many problems in applying the antitrust laws to
municipalities.

